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Abstract 
This policy brief argues that the decentralisation of Serbia through delegating more 
authority to municipalities could benefit minority groups that constitute a local majority. 
Although there are three such minority communities living in Serbia, the Bosniaks in 
Sandzak, the Albanians in Presevo Valley and the Hungarians in Vojvodina, the paper 
focuses on the first two groups, because their problems could potentially destabilise 
Serbia and the wider region. Thus, addressing the root causes of tensions in these two 
regions is an urgent task. Moreover, not only would minorities gain from sound 
decentralisation – all municipalities would do so regardless of ethnicity. Ultimately, 
decentralisation would be an essential step in Serbia’s democratisation process 
following the example of other Central and Eastern European countries. 
The present brief was published by the Brussels based Centre for European Policy 
Studies in July 2007. A more extensive discussion of Serbian decentralization and its 
effects on national minorities will be published in a forthcoming issue of Problems of 
Post-Communism. 
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1 Minority grievances as a potential source of soft 
security threats 
Serbia has recently returned to the international spotlight, mostly because of the 
Kosovo issue and the country’s lack of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. While 
sufficient attention has been given to resolving tensions between ethnic Albanians and 
the Serbian minority in Kosovo, the grievances of ethnic minorities within Serbia have 
gone mostly unnoticed by the international community. Although the problems of 
Serbia’s national minorities do not compare with the gravity of the situation in Kosovo, 
the EU’s 2006 Progress Report
1
 on Serbia recognises that the political situation 
remains tense in southern Serbia and Sandzak, which are home to Serbia’s Albanian 
and Bosniak communities respectively. Developments on the ground also indicate that 
problems relating to the situation of these two minorities continue to pose soft security 
threats to Serbia and to the wider region. While in southern Serbia inter-ethnic tensions 
are still pronounced, in Sandzak political divisions within the Bosniak community cause 
instability.  
In January 2006, Albanian councillors of the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac 
and Medvedja adopted a common political platform in which they “commit to [the] 
unification of Presevo Valley with Kosovo in case of…possible change of [Kosovo’s] 
borders”.
2
 In June 2007, Jonuz Musliu, deputy chief of the Bujanovac municipality, 
called on the leaders of all the Albanian political parties from Bujanovac and Presevo to 
form a joint National Council, which could represent Albanian aspirations to join 
Kosovo.  
I believe it is time to form a National Council which would adopt a joint platform, with 
which we would start negotiations with the Serbian government about merging the 
Bujanovac and Presevo municipalities with Kosovo.
3
 
                                            
1
 See European Commission, Serbia 2006 Progress Report, Commission Staff Working Document, 
COM(2006) 649 final, Brussels, 8 November 2006. 
2
 Derived from the platform document, “Albanian Councillors of Presheva Valley (Preshevo, Bujanovac 
and Medvedja) in Meeting Held on 14 January 2006 in Preshevo”, 2006 (document in the author’s 
possession).  
3
 See the article “Valley Albanians push for talks on the merger of Kosovo”, B92 news website, 6 June 
2007 (retrieved from http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-
article.php?yyyy=2007&mm=06&dd=06&nav_category=93&nav_id=41632). 
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Although southern Serbia is peaceful at the moment, fighting is not such a distant 
memory for the Valley’s Albanians. Their 17 months of insurgency came to an end in 
May 2001, but small-scale incidents continued in 2002 and 2003. 
While the Albanians of Presevo Valley are contemplating the idea of pushing for 
secession, Sandzak Bosniaks’ demands for autonomy also resurface occasionally. In 
2002, upon the drafting of the constitution of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, Bosniaks argued for the designation of Sandzak as an autonomous 
territorial and political unit within the common state. Hopes for establishing a unified 
Sandzak region across the borders of Serbia and Montenegro vanished after the State 
Union disintegrated, but the List for Sandzak (a coalition of Bosniak parties that 
participated in Vojislav Kostunica’s previous government until 2006) continues to stand 
for administrative and territorial autonomy for Sandzak, with wide-ranging powers to 
include the regional police and judiciary.
4
 Nevertheless, in Sandzak, the most 
dangerous sources of insecurity are infighting among local political bosses (which is -
often marked by violence), organised crime (which has penetrated political structures), 
widespread drug use among the youth and the disturbing presence of the radical 
Wahhabi group. Owing to weak local government autonomy, the central government 
has been able to play off local political rivals within the Bosniak community against one 
another, contributing to the escalation of tensions and to the destabilisation of 
municipal governments. If the grievances of the Bosniak community are not addressed, 
there is a danger of further nationalist and religious radicalisation. Moreover, the region 
could potentially turn into a hub of organised crime, with perpetual low-scale violence.  
It is argued here that the Serbian government could reduce existing ethnic tensions 
by increasing local government autonomy. This move would be a simple and effective 
way to address some of the everyday life problems of minorities. As the decision on 
Kosovo’s status is approaching, it is likely that solutions implying any kind of territorial 
autonomy or federalisation would be unacceptable to the Serbian authorities. Yet 
decentralisation at the municipal level could be a feasible option, which would please 
not only minorities, but also all municipalities regardless of ethnicity, as it would 
empower local communities and increase the accountability of local governments. The 
most important next step would be to transfer public property to municipal governments 
to enable them to play a larger role in upgrading the infrastructure in their areas and to 
                                            
4
 Derived from an interview with Esad Džudžević, President of the Bosniak National Council, Novi Pazar, 
12 August 2006. 
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contribute to local economic development. The Serbian government should also further 
extend the sphere of local competencies, which would strengthen local ownership over 
public services. 
2 Minority rights in Serbia 
In principle, minorities are granted far-reaching rights in Serbia, including the right to 
preserve their language, culture and national identity; to receive education in their 
mother tongue until high school; to use their national symbols; to obtain public 
information in their languages; and to have appropriate representation in the public 
sector. The law on national minorities provides a sound legal basis for the protection of 
minority rights in Serbia and grants minorities cultural autonomy. It allows them to set 
up minority councils through which they can “exercise their rights of self-government 
regarding the use of language and script, education, information and culture”.
5
 The 
major provisions of the law on national minorities were also enshrined in the new 
Serbian constitution adopted in late 2006. Yet, problems are arising with the 
implementation of the law, which often falls short of the rights granted in principle. 
While minorities are increasingly vocalising the need for more ethnic-territorial 
autonomy, their grievances centre on daily life problems, such as under-representation 
in the public sector, lack of economic development, higher rather average 
unemployment and obstacles that prevent the implementation of the cultural and 
language rights granted by law. Here too the strengthening of local autonomy would be 
a way to respond to these grievances, which could reduce tensions and marginalise 
potential irredentists.  
Still, it should be stressed that decentralisation is not a panacea and would not 
solve all the problems minorities are facing, so it should be complemented by further 
measures. School curricula should reflect the multi-ethnic character of Serbia, hate 
speech and ethnocentric views spread by the media or school textbooks should not be 
tolerated, and minorities should be included into the police and judiciary in higher 
numbers, just to name a few examples that would be equally important to create a 
more minority-friendly atmosphere in Serbia. Better representation of minorities in the 
police and judiciary is crucial, as these institutions are often perceived as being 
                                            
5
 See Art. 19 of the Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities, Official Gazette of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), No. 11, 27.02.2002, translated by the OSCE Mission to FRY. 
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insensitive to minorities’ problems. The weak response by the judiciary and police was 
at least partly responsible for the increase in inter-ethnic incidents in 2003 and 2004 in 
Vojvodina, thus the integration of minorities into the police and the courts is strongly 
recommended, as it could raise the level of trust between minorities and the state.
 6
 
3 Problems encountered by minorities 
Most of the problems facing minorities, especially in Sandzak and southern Serbia, 
are related to poverty and economic underdevelopment. Sandzak and southern Serbia 
are among Serbia’s most economically depressed areas, with per capita annual 
income a third of the Serbian average. Unusually high unemployment rates (estimated 
at around 60-70% in southern Serbia,
7
 and at around 30% in Sandzak
8
), neglected 
infrastructure and a lack of economic prospects continue to be serious destabilising 
factors. A history of discriminating state policies means that grievances often gain an 
ethnic interpretation. The recently growing popularity of Wahhabism among Sandzak 
Muslims, who traditionally practice a moderate version of Islam, has also been blamed 
on the dire economic circumstances by local analysts. Mehmed Slezovic, co-chair of 
the non-governmental organisation Sandzak Intellectual Circle, has argued that the 
single most important local factor behind the growing number of Wahhabi followers is 
the region’s economic crisis: “Jobs are hard to come by for young people who are then 
exposed to various influences – they are easy prey both for drug dealers and religious 
fundamentalists.”
9
 Similarly, Belgrade mufti Muhamed Jusufspahic has maintained that 
“unemployment, political conflicts and increasing numbers of drug addicts” have 
created fertile ground for the spread of Wahhabism in Novi Pazar.
10
  
Similarly, Albanian secessionist aspirations are also fuelled mostly by growing 
impatience with the lack of economic progress and Albanians’ lack of integration into 
                                            
6
 For further information on this point, see Florian Bieber and Jenni Winterhagen, Ethnic Violence in 
Vojvodina: Glitch or Harbinger of Conflicts to Come?, ECMI Working Paper No. 27, European Centre for 
Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany, April 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_27.pdf).  
7
 The rate was 60% in Bujanovac and 70% in Presevo; see International Crisis Group (ICG), Southern 
Serbia in Kosovo’s Shadow, Europe Briefing No. 43, ICG, Brussels, 27 June 2006, p. 7. 
8
 The figure was 35% in Novi Pazar; see ICG, Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten, Europe Report No. 162, 
ICG, Belgrade/Brussels, 8 April 2005, p. 35. 
9
 See Amela Bajrovic, “Wahhabism Fuels Novi Pazar Religious Tensions”, Balkan Insight, No. 62, 6 
December 2006 (retrieved from http://www.birn.eu.com/en/ 
62/10/1844/?ILStart=20). 
10
 Ibid. 
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the public sector. As explained by a local Albanian politician in relation to why the 
Albanians of Presevo Valley want to join Kosovo, “six years after the end of the conflict 
in this region, nothing has changed in the political and economic sense, except for the 
forming of multi-ethnic police”.
11
 Despite recent efforts by the state, ethnic minorities 
remain strongly under-represented in most institutions under central control (among 
them the post office, tax authorities, land registry, social institutions, healthcare 
centres, customs services, state inspection bodies, the police and the judiciary). This 
situation implies that public sector jobs are less available to them, and as a result, 
minority languages are rarely used in official communications within these state bodies 
and agencies, even if theoretically a minority language is in official use locally.
12
 
It should also be noted that since Bosniak, Albanian and Hungarian parties have 
begun to participate in municipal governments the problem of ethnic disproportion has 
decreased in local administration and in those areas that are under local authority.  
4 Obstacles hampering local government autonomy 
Given that Sandzak and Presevo Valley are among the poorest areas in Serbia, 
removing the existing barriers to local economic development is essential. The single 
biggest problem for local governments in Serbia is the fact that they do not own any 
property. Municipalities only have usage rights on public property owned by the state, 
which severely limits the viability of local governments. The European Council in its 
2006 European Partnership document called on Serbia “to adopt and implement 
decentralisation reform ensuring [the] viability of local governments”.
13
 That being said, 
the new constitution does mention the category of municipal property, which may be a 
promising sign of future devolution. 
In Serbia, the lack of ownership rights for municipal governments hampers local 
economic development in two ways. First, it discourages the much-needed upgrading 
                                            
11
 See the B92 website article “Valley Albanians push for talks on the merger of Kosovo” (2007), op. cit. 
12
 According to the law on official language use, the language of a minority becomes official in a 
municipality if that minority makes up at least 15% of the population or if the proportion of all national 
minorities reaches 10% of the population. Nevertheless, the law also allows municipalities to recognise a 
language as official if the proportion of a minority group in question is below 15%. Hungarian, for 
example, is official in 30 municipalities out of the 45 municipalities in Vojvodina. 
13
 See European Council, Council Decision 2006/56/EC of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities 
and conditions contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as 
defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 
2004/520/EC, OJ L 35/32, 07.02.2006 (retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_035/l_03520060207en00320056.pdf). 
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of local infrastructure and public services, which would be a prerequisite for attracting 
investment and creating favourable conditions for private businesses. Second, local 
administrative procedures tend to be slow and complicated, putting unnecessary 
barriers in the way of potential investors. Municipal authorities have to obtain the 
consent of central authorities on all major decisions related to public property.
14
 
Sometimes the procedure can take years, which can jeopardise potential investments. 
The example of Tutin, the poorest municipality in Sandzak with a Bosniak majority 
population, demonstrates how the lack of property rights is restraining economic 
growth. In 2004, the municipality of Tutin applied to the Republic’s Property Directorate 
for approval to transfer usage rights of a piece of land to Orije MZ, a local community. 
The community wants to use the area for a €2 million investment, including the 
construction of a ski centre. This investment would boost tourism in the region as well 
as create 200 new jobs. It took two years for the municipality – where the annual 
income is 17% of the Serbian average – to obtain the consent of the Republic, thus 
delaying the project and economic activity.
15
 
It should be stressed that property devolution in itself would not eliminate poverty 
and underdevelopment, but it would set up the necessary preconditions for 
infrastructure development in the area and local development in general. Local efforts 
should be accompanied by a balanced regional development policy – an aspiration that 
has already been adopted as one of the new government’s main priorities – and should 
also be backed by the EU’s technical and financial assistance. 
In addition, it can also be argued that some functions still under central control 
could be carried out more effectively locally. The literature on local government finance 
maintains that placing certain public services at the local level would lead to a quality 
and quantity of services that most closely matches the community’s preferences. In 
Serbia, municipal governments have no influence on the operations of the electricity, 
gas or telecommunications providers, which are run by state-owned companies. Nor do 
they have any influence on area branches of Republic ministries or agencies.
16
 The 
quality of some services might improve by delegating them to the local level, because 
                                            
14
 See the USAID’s Serbian Local Government Reform Program Newsletter, No. 12, September–
December 2005 (retrieved from http://www.slgrp.usaid.org.yu/). 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Derived from correspondence with Dusan Vasiljevic, of the Serbian Local Government Reform 
Program, 25 January 2007. 
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local governments would then be directly responsible and would have a greater stake 
in service provision. 
One such sphere of competency is the ordering of land registers. The fact that real 
estate registries are in disarray and that many buildings have no property status is 
currently a serious problem hindering economic development in Serbia. Under such 
circumstances, investors take a considerable risk upon buying any property, since 
there is no guarantee that the registries match real conditions. Moreover, the disorderly 
real estate registry makes urban and infrastructure investment planning difficult and 
complicated. Local governments have an obvious interest in clearing up the real estate 
registry and deed books, if they want to attract investors or carry out any kind of local 
development plan. Furthermore, since the collection of property tax was fully assigned 
to the local level, municipal governments have become especially interested in creating 
up-to-date cadastres and land registers. It would make sense, therefore, for local 
governments to have some kind of authority over land and deed registers, which are 
today entirely controlled by the state.
17
  
The central government should also deal with property restitution, without which 
property ownership relations cannot be clarified. This issue was also stressed by the 
European Council’s latest European Partnership document in 2006. 
It should be also added here that local governments could manage more 
competencies only if they have sufficient administrative capacity. Therefore, the central 
government should assist local authorities in the process, providing them with the 
necessary technical expertise and know-how. Particular functions should be delegated 
to the local level only when a municipal government demonstrates its ability to handle 
such tasks. 
In Macedonia, during the recently launched decentralisation reform, several 
functions that used to be under central control were delegated to the local level 
gradually, including among others land registries, transport and communications, and 
public revenue offices. Often these functions remained delegated to local governments, 
meaning that the central government could check not only the lawfulness, but also 
review the appropriateness of actions taken in the performance of these duties. 
Nevertheless, as a result local governments gained direct insight into and influence 
over their functioning; moreover, from the beginning of 2007 the employees of these 
                                            
17
 See the Handbook for Local Councillors, available on the website of the Standing Conference of Towns 
and Municipalities (retrieved from http://www.skgo.org/codenavigate.php?Id=266), p. 51. 
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institutions have been paid from the local budget, which also means that hiring staff 
has become a local prerogative.
18
  
It can be also presupposed that if local governments had authority over services 
and bodies currently under central state control, the quality of services would improve 
and the integration of minorities into those institutions would accelerate. A further, 
positive side effect would entail the opportunity to implement the official use of minority 
languages more widely. In those municipalities where minorities participate in local 
government, local authorities are more likely to make the necessary effort to foster 
conditions for the official use of minority languages and to integrate minorities into 
public institutions.  
Obviously, changing employment patterns involves a long process and cannot be 
done overnight. Recruiting more persons belonging to minorities into public institutions 
requires a range of affirmative action policies, including educational and training 
programmes.  
If local governments’ spheres of authority were to be extended, however, 
responsibility would lie more with them for fulfilling the need to integrate minorities into 
the public sector and implementing the official use of minority languages, and it would 
be less easy to blame the Serbian state for lack of progress.  
5 An opening policy window – The right moment to 
push for reforms 
After almost four months of political stalemate and just prior to the constitutional 
deadline, Serbia’s democratically oriented parties finally managed to reach a 
consensus about the new government. Given that Serbia has just gotten back on the 
democratic political track and has indicated its readiness to continue negotiations with 
the EU, this might be the right moment to push for further reforms, such as for the 
continuation of the decentralisation process, launched in 2002 by the adoption of a new 
Law on Local Self-Government.
19
 As the UN Security Council is about to adopt a new 
resolution on Kosovo’s status, the EU has a clear interest in drawing Serbia closer with 
a view to preserving stability on its south-eastern borders. The EU has a stake in 
                                            
18
 Derived from an interview with Islam Yusufi of Analytica in Skopje, 18 September 2006. 
19 See the Law on Local Self-Government, adopted by the Serbian Assembly on 14 February 2002 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 9, 26.02.2002). 
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keeping Serbia on the pro-EU, democratic path, and seems willing to speed up 
Serbia’s accession process. As negotiations with the EU are underway, the window of 
opportunity is reopening to stimulate the continuation of the pro-EU political reforms in 
Serbia that were put on hold at the start of the government crisis in October 2006.  
Other reasons the EU should grab the opportunity now to push for reforms have 
been highlighted by the recent political crisis and the popularity of the Serbian Radical 
Party: the prevalence of democratic forces cannot be taken for granted, nor can the 
chance of a nationalist backlash be fully excluded. 
6 Conclusions and recommendations 
Decentralisation would be a general public good for every local community, not just 
for minorities. Establishing meaningful local autonomy would require the Serbian 
government to proceed with the decentralisation reform through adopting further 
measures. The above-mentioned Law on Local Self-Government was intended as a 
first step in a longer process, and was welcomed by the Council of Europe, according 
to which the law was good enough to provide an acceptable legal basis for local 
authority. Municipalities continue to face many difficulties, however. A new Law on 
Local Government Finance,
20
 which came into force on 1 January 2007, entails greater 
fiscal decentralisation, but the necessary regulations on municipal property and 
management have not been adopted. The Standing Conference of Cities and 
Municipalities (SKGO), which is the largest organisation of local governments, prepared 
the draft law on municipal property, but passage of this law has been continually 
postponed by the government. 
Although the new Serbian constitution introduced the category of municipal 
property, it failed expectations for further decentralisation. Instead of strengthening 
local autonomy, the constitution increased the central government’s sway over local 
governments.  
The influence and pressure of the EU would thus be necessary for reforms to 
continue and further decentralisation to come. The requirement for greater 
decentralisation – meaning increasing the autonomy of local governments – should be 
put forward as a demand by the EU during its negotiations with Serbia.  
                                            
20
 See the Law on Local Government Finance, document published in the Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Serbia, implemented as of 1 January 2007. 
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In summary, the following recommendations are made to Serbia and the EU: 
• Serbia should continue with the decentralisation reform launched in 2002. The most 
important next step would be the devolution of property to municipal governments.  
• Serbia should explore which further functions could be managed better locally. 
Several functions of vital importance for local communities are still under central 
state control, with their management personnel being appointed by the state, as in 
the case of hospitals, electricity providers, the audit office and post office, the gas 
provider, telecommunications providers, the inspection organisation, the land and 
deed registry, and the cadastre. Local authorities have no affect on the employment 
practices or the work of these bodies, and thus on the quality of services.  
• As devolving more competencies to the local level requires sufficient local 
administrative capacity to manage these tasks, the government should work closely 
with the SKGO, the European Agency for Reconstruction, USAID and other 
stakeholders during the decentralisation process. SKGO has recently launched a 
project investigating how legislative impediments to local economic development in 
Serbia can be overcome, including analysing the legal changes needed. 
• The recently adopted reforms related to the intergovernmental finance system – 
especially the introduction of property tax at the local level and the granting of local 
discretion over various tax rates – points in the direction of greater local fiscal 
autonomy. The implementation of these reforms should be closely monitored, as 
their credibility will be measured by how well they are carried out. 
• Safeguard measures are needed, which guarantee that no local majority can 
overrule local minorities. Introducing the requirement of supermajorities could be a 
solution. 
• Institutional mechanisms and safeguards need to be put in place to ensure that the 
appointments of individuals to various functions are based on merit and 
qualifications and not on party connections.  
• Shared authority over the police between the central and the local government is 
also recommended. It would be desirable if cooperation between the local police 
and the municipal authorities were institutionalised. 
• Revitalising the local economy and developing local infrastructure in Presevo Valley 
and Sandzak is crucial for creating lasting stability. The international community 
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should provide financial and technical assistance to Serbia to carry out a balanced 
regional development policy, recognising that stabilising these areas is in the 
regional interest. 
 
